John William Powell and  The China Weekly Review : An analysis of his reporting and his McCarthy era ordeal by Shen, Fuyuan
University of Montana 
ScholarWorks at University of Montana 
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & 
Professional Papers Graduate School 
1993 
John William Powell and "The China Weekly Review": An analysis 
of his reporting and his McCarthy era ordeal 
Fuyuan Shen 
The University of Montana 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Shen, Fuyuan, "John William Powell and "The China Weekly Review": An analysis of his reporting and his 
McCarthy era ordeal" (1993). Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 5063. 
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/5063 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of 
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an 
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu. 
Maureen and Mike 
MANSFIELD LIBRARY
The University ofMontana
Permission is granted by the author to reproduce this material in its entirety, 
provided that this material is used for scholarly purposes and is properly cited 
in published works and reports.
* *  Please check “ Yes ” or “No ”  and provide signature**
Yes, I grant permission _ /l£ 
No, I do not grant permission____
Author’s Signature
Date:
Any copying for commercial purposes or financial gain may be undertaken 
only with the author’s explicit consent.
MA1.ICOPY.PM4
John William Powell and The China Weekly Review:
An Analysis of His Reporting and His McCarthy Era Ordeal
Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of 





Chairman, Board of Examiners
UMI Number: EP40527
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
UMT
UMI EP40527
Published by ProQuest LLC (2014). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
ProQuest
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
Shen, Fuyuan, M.A., July 1993 Journalism
John William Powell and The China Weekly Review: An Analysis 
of His Reporting and His McCarthy Era Ordeal.
Advisor: Dr. Charles E. Hood, Jr. C iEl ---- CU.
This study explains the life of John William Powell with 
particular emphasis on his experience as the editor The China 
Weekly Review in Shanghai after World War II, and the 
difficulty he went through after he returned to the United 
States during the McCarthy era.
Powell was born in China, but was reared mainly in the 
United States. He attended the University of Missouri School 
of Journalism. After America entered World War II, Powell went 
to work in the Office of War Information.
In 1945, Powell went to Shanghai to restart the Review, 
which his father, J.B. Powell, had edited and owned. The 
journal, known to be critical of Japan's aggression in Asia, 
was shut down during the Japanese occupation of Shanghai, and 
his father was physically incapacitated in Japanese jails.
During the Korean War, Powell hailed the Chinese entry into 
the war, and echoed Chinese and North Korean charges that the 
United States was engaged in germ warfare. The Review 
purportedly was used by the Chinese for ideological 
indoctrination in U.S. POW camps. Failure to comply with the 
indoctrination was reported to have resulted in the death of 
U.S. prisoners.
Powell eventually closed down the Review because of 
increasing financial losses, and returned to the United States 
with his family in 1953. After his return, the Powells faced 
Congressional hearings and later the government charged him 
with treason and sedition. The ordeal cost him dearly, both 
professionally and economically, but finally the government 
dropped all the charges against him in 1961 for lack of 
evidence.
This study of Powell's writings concludes that he did not 
knowingly falsify anything, but he was not as objective as he 
could have been in his reporting. The issue of germ warfare 
remains open. Except for that, most of what Powell reported 
about the war actually happened. Western historians 
interpreted same facts differently, but the differences are 
largely matters of opinion or are rooted in differing cultural 
perspectives. Today, Powell remains as convinced as he was 
then about his germ warfare charges.
Powell's case shows journalists how difficult it is to cover 
a foreign country when tension is high between nations. It 
also shows that journalists can be easily manipulated or led 
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Of all the China Hands, a group of American foreign
service officers and journalists who were accused of being
overly sympathetic to the Chinese Communists during and after 
World War II, John William Powell perhaps suffered the most 
and the longest from McCarthy ism. He was among the few 
Americans to stay in China after the Communists took over. 
After he came back, he faced the charges of sedition and 
treason, and lost his newspaper career.
He was also the most controversial of the China Hands. 
Considered to be a "fearless and fair" journalist by his 
colleagues in the news profession at one time, he would later 
be characterized by them as a turncoat "Red China Boy" as a
Newsweek article labeled him.
Powell was born in Shanghai, the son of a prominent 
American journalist, John Benjamin Powell. Both he and his 
father were educated at the University of Missouri School of 
Journalism. He worked in 1940 as a newsman in China before 
joining the U.S. Office of War Information as an editor at the 
start of World War II.
In 1945, he took over his father's paper, The China 
Weekly Review, in Shanghai. His father, who had edited the 
Review since 1917 and had purchased it in 1922, had been a 
strong supporter of the Chinese Nationalists and an outspoken 
critic of Japanese militarism.
As the Chinese Nationalists desperately tried in the post
1
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World War II years to impose their rule on China, the Review, 
under the operation of Powell, grew increasingly critical of 
the regime. Its editorials and essays highlighted the 
inefficiency, cruelty, corruption and press censorship of the 
Nationalist government. Powell's wife, Sylvia, and another 
American journalist, Julian Schuman, also worked at the Review 
at that time.
After the Communists took over mainland China in 1949, 
the Review, having changed to a monthly, published laudatory 
reports of the conditions in Communist-held territories. It 
became the only English-language paper to be published in 
China after 1949.
During the Korean War, the magazine devoted much 
attention to criticizing American military and diplomatic 
policies. From 1951 to 1953, Powell published a variety of 
stories detailing China and North Korea's germ warfare charges 
against the United States. The American government, however, 
discredited Powell for his views. When he returned to the 
United States with his wife and two small children in 1954, he 
found a hostile environment.
A congressional committee interrogated him and then 
lobbied hard for his prosecution. The State Department and 
some military officials, angry over the Review's the germ 
warfare charges, also sought to punish Powell.
He was indicted in early 1956 for sedition, but the 
proceeding resulted in a mistrial nearly three years later.
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Despite repeated threats by the U.S. government that he would 
be retried or indicted for treason, no more efforts were made 
to prosecute him. Finally, in 1961, U.S. Attorney General 
Robert F. Kennedy ordered the sedition indictment dismissed 
and closed the investigation of treason charges on grounds 
that evidence proving an overt act of treason was impossible 
to obtain.
To defend themselves, Powell and his wife, Sylvia, spent 
more than $4 0,000 of their own savings and funds raised on 
their behalf. Because of the political environment of that 
time, they could not find jobs in the United States. 
Effectively "blacklisted" by newspapers, Powell eventually 
read a book on carpentry and developed a new career renovating 
Victorian houses in San Francisco. He still maintains his 
interest in China and germ warfare.
"Because of what I wrote critically— indeed harshly— of 
America's China policy and of my country's role in the Korean 
War," he said in 1984, "we had seven difficult years. They 
were frightening, time-consuming, and horribly expensive." He 
condemned those who "try— and sometimes succeed— in shaping 
the news to fit their own narrow interests," because they "do 
their countries a great disservice."
Throughout the years, Powell persisted in securing 
classified documents in an attempt to prove the truth of what 
he had written in the early 1950s. The charges regarding 
American use of bacteriological weapons during the Korean War
4
remain unproved. The truth undoubtedly lies buried in 
governmental archives in Washington and Beijing.
However, recent evidence shows that the U.S. Army used 
Japanese personnel to assist its bacteriological warfare 
programs after World War II. This, some scholars argued, tends 
to support Powell's contention. But some government officials 
knew about the Army's use of Japanese military personnel 
before the indictment against Powell was prepared. It was 
probably the government's intention, scholars argued, to 
suppress anything that might even imply, let alone prove, that 
it had engaged in germ warfare.
The purpose of the thesis is to study Powell's writings 
in the Review to see whether he objectively reported the 
Korean War. To achieve this goal, news sources and Powell's 
stands on various issues will be studied in detail. The author 
will also compare the Review's coverage of the Communist germ 
warfare charges with that of other U.S. media such as The New 
York Times.
In the next few chapters, an effort is made to put Powell 
and his magazine into historical perspective, so that a 
conclusion can be made as to how responsibly Powell had 
behaved. Was he, like other old China Hands, an innocent 
victim of the Red scare of the 1940s and 1950s, or did he 
contribute to his difficulties by failing to meet American 
standards of responsible, fair-minded journalism?
Chapter Two. The United States and China:
A Historical Review
U.S. contact with China started more than one hundred and 
fifty years before John William Powell took over The China 
Weekly Review. Since 1784, when the American ship "Empress of 
China" arrived to trade at the port of Canton in the middle of 
the Qing dynasty(1644-1911), relations between the United 
States and China had been mainly centered around bilateral 
trade. The first treaty between the United States and China, 
the Wangsha Treaty, was signed in 1844. Through this 
agreement, the United States secured the same trade rights 
that the British had won from China in the Opium War(1839- 
1842) , and also a promise to enjoy all future privileges given 
by China to other nations.
Other trade agreements in the nineteenth century, the 
Treaty of Tientsin in 1858 and the Burlingame Treaty of 1868, 
contained most-favored nation clauses. As a result of these 
treaties, whenever a Western country compelled China to grant 
new demands in the next hundred years or so, the same benefits 
passed automatically to the Americans.1
The first American minister to the empire of China was 
Anson Burlingame, appointed by President Abraham Lincoln in 
1861. He negotiated China's first bilateral agreement with a 
Western power, thus making America the first occidental nation
1 Michael Shaller, The United States and China in the 
Twentieth Century (New York and Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1990), p. 14.
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to recognize China as an equal. Burlingame was known to be the 
sole Western diplomat to often walk out of his office to meet 
with Chinese workers and officials. His sincere effort to 
understand the complexities of the Chinese society gained him 
unusual confidence in the Chinese imperial court. His 
influence on America's China policy left its mark thirty years 
later when Secretary of State John Hay enunciated the Open 
Door Policy in 1899.2 Under the policy, foreign nations 
received equal opportunity for trade with China and promised 
to respect China's territorial and administrative integrity.
Because the United States was a latecomer to the China 
trade, American interests were in securing equal access to 
Chinese markets. China's sovereignty was only a secondary 
consideration for the U.S. government.3 Besides the desire of 
trading profits, there was also a strong moral element to U.S. 
involvement with China. The first American missionaries 
arrived in 1811. Although relatively few in number, they 
became enormously influential in Chinese intellectual circles 
and in forming American perceptions of China. Virtually every 
denomination in the United States at the turn of this century 
had its China mission society, and U.S. congregations received 
periodic missionary reports praising the good qualities of the
2 John Tierney, Jr., About Face: The China Decision and 
Its Consequences (New York: Arlington House Publishers, 1979) , 
P. 126.
3 Chin-Chuan Lee, Voices of China: The Interplay of
Politics and Journalism (New York and London: The Guilford 
Press, 1990), p. 203.
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Chinese people and pointing to their desperate need for food, 
medicine, and modern education.4
By the 1890s, about 1,500 U.S. missionaries were working 
in China. Of particular importance were the many mission-run 
schools and universities established throughout China. These 
schools became the primary means whereby Chinese intellectuals 
learned about Western thought.
The U.S. military also had a role in early Sino-American 
relations. U.S. forces regularly protected American traders 
and missionaries, and a sizable contingent of Marines was 
deployed to assist in the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion 
in 1900. Most of the money received by the United States as 
indemnity for the Boxer Rebellion was used to educate Chinese 
students in the United States.5
The most emotional issue in early Sino-American relations 
was Chinese immigration to the United States. Thousands of 
Chinese were recruited to help build the first 
transcontinental railways across the United States during the 
1850s and 18 60s. But racist actions against the Chinese swept 
the western states. In the 1880s, the U.S. Congress passed a 
series of laws restricting further immigration of the Chinese 
and requiring resident Chinese to register and carry 
identification wherever they went. Angered by this
4 Martin L. Lasater, Policy in Evolution: The U.S. Role 
in China's Reunification (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 
1989), p. 8.
5 Ibid.
discrimination, Chinese students led boycotts against American 
goods in China during the early part of this century.6
1. Early American Journalism in China
U.S. economic and cultural contacts with the Far East
brought the first wave of American journalists to China. Most 
of them arrived in 1900 to report the lifting of the Boxer
Siege and then, in 1905, returned for the Russo-Japanese War
in Manchuria. Few of these correspondents actually remained in 
the Far East, however.
The core group of American correspondents assigned to 
China in the year 1909 was tiny. It comprised two men in 
Beijing (from The Associated Press and the New York Herald), 
and Thomas F.F. Millard, a former war correspondent for the 
Herald, who also represented several other papers as a 
correspondent-at-large. Reporting for the New York Herald from 
Hong Kong was Australian journalist W. H. Donald. These men 
were ahead of their time in U. S. journalism because before 
the First World War, the U.S. press did not have specialists 
in foreign nations. International news was the domain of Great 
Britain.7
American correspondent Thomas Millard was a pioneer who 
belonged to no tradition in American journalism and who
6 Lasater, Policy in Evolution, p. 8.
7 I have relied for much of the history of early of 
American journalism in China on Peter Rand's "A Quixotic 
Adventure: The American Press in China, 1900-1950." The
article appeared in Chin-Chuan Lee's Voices of China.
9
created the role of the China Hand as journalist to which 
successive generations of American reporters adapted 
themselves. Theodore Roosevelt was a fan of Thomas Millard's 
journalism. He admired Millard's anti-British dispatches from 
the Boer War and his Russo-Japanese War reports. The president 
encouraged Millard to educate the American public about China 
through books and magazine articles. He urged Millard to 
transform public indifference into popular support for a 
strong pro-China policy. Millard did so with zeal and made 
China his business, impressing Chinese government officials 
with his access to Americans in high places and becoming an 
intermediary in the promotion of American bank loans to China. 
Being an expansionist and a democratic idealist, Millard used 
journalism as a tool to spread his ideas about American 
expansion in the Far East and at the same time to advance the 
economic interest of China in Washington against those of 
Great Britain and Japan. He was fundamentally anti­
imperialist, especially anti-British and anti-Japanese, and 
believed that expanding American commerce in China would bring 
with it special benefits for the Chinese people.8
American readership then knew very little about China. 
Therefore, most of the journalists wrote books or published 
treaty-port newspapers for American business subscribers in 
Shanghai and other coastal ports. Millard established an 
English language newspaper, The China Press and, an English
8 Lee, Voices of China, pp. 204-205.
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weekly journal, Millard's Review of the Far East. These 
journalists stayed in China partly because the colonial life 
gave them a sense of importance. They were at the top of the 
heap, socially and economically. Underneath it all, though, 
the motive that inspired U.S. correspondents to live and work 
in China was the strong attachment they formed to the Chinese 
people and their national aspirations. It was this feeling 
that influenced how they wrote about China and gave the 
profession of reporting from China its guixotic character.
During his involvement in China, Millard sought to 
improve Sino-American communications and help China break the 
British monopoly of the news by giving the Chinese the means 
of quickly presenting their point of view. Later, he joined 
the Chinese government as a political advisor and remained in 
that position for several years.9
A godfather figure, Millard was an enthusiastic supporter 
of the Missouri School of Journalism.10 His "anti-colonial, 
anti-imperialist, pro-independence, pro-Republican and pro- 
American" values were passed on to the new generations of 
journalists in China through J.B. Powell, who was the father 
of John William Powell. An instructor at the University of
9 John Maxwell Hamilton, "The Missouri News Monopoly and 
American Altruism in China: Thomas F.F. Millard, J.B. Powell, 
and Edgar Snow," Pacific Historical Review (February 1986), p. 
33
10 Stephen R. Mackinnon and Oris Friesen, China Reporting: 
An Oral History of American Journalism in the 193 0s & 1940s 
(Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California 
Press, 1987), p. 25.
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Missouri School of Journalism, J.B. Powell went to China in 
1917 at the invitation of Millard to run Millard's Review of 
the Far East. He stayed on in China for 2 5 years and 
eventually bought Millard's journal, which he renamed The 
China Weekly Review.
Dean Walter Williams, founder of the Missouri journalism 
school, had recommended Powell to Millard. Williams had 
visited the Far East and was responsible for creating a Far 
East study program at the University of Missouri that prepared 
future journalists for China. Williams also contributed to the 
growth of professionalism in the Chinese press. He established 
the exchange program between the schools of journalism at 
Missouri and Yenching University in Peking. Missouri 
instructors were sent to teach at the first journalism school 
in China at Yenching and Chinese students traveled to Missouri 
to study journalism.11
During the 192 0s and 1930s, more than 4 0 graduates of the 
Missouri Journalism School found their way to China. Besides 
Millard and J.B. Powell, others who were well-known among this 
"Missouri mafia" were: Carl Crow, the first city editor of The 
China Press and author of Guide Book to China, a "bible" for 
tourists; Emily Hanh, whose books— The Soonq Sisters and China 
to Me— were bestsellers; and Edgar Snow, who later ventured
11 Peter Rand, "A Quixotic Adventure," p. 2 06.
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into the Communist-held area and wrote Red Star Over China.12
Another writer on Asian topics was Agnes Smedley, a 
native of Missouri, although she was not generally associated 
with the University of Missouri. Having traveled extensively 
and resided in Shanghai, she became popular in America for her 
books, The Daughter of the Earth and Battle Hymn of China.
2. China's Civil War and the War With Japan
In 1927, when a series of domestic events finally put 
China in the hands of Chiang Kai-shek, the country seemed less 
chaotic to the world than it had been before. The U.S. 
government adopted a laissez-faire policy in the Far East 
after the Washington Conference of 1921-1922. With the belief 
that nothing seriously affecting America's Far East policy 
would happen, the U.S. government withdrew from the area as an 
active force to be reckoned with.13
In the few years after 1927, Chiang was primarily 
concerned with the extermination of the Communists and their 
sympathizers, who were forced to the countryside to wage 
guerilla warfare. With the support of the powerful in China 
and industrialized nations in the West, Chiang became 
increasingly assertive in his efforts to control China. 
Finally, in 1935 after the famous Long March through mountains 
and rivers in the west, the Red Army established its
12 John B. Powell, "Missouri Authors and Journalists in 
the Orient," Missouri Historical Review. October 194 6, pp. 45- 
55.
13 Rand, "A Quixotic Adventure," p. 207.
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headquarters in Yenan, its wartime capital in Shaanxi 
Province.
The fight for legitimacy between the Nationalists and the 
Communists was complicated by Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 
1931. Japan's invasion posed a direct challenge to U.S. faith 
in the Far Eastern status quo and also to the League of 
Nations. The invasion was a major international story. So was 
the outbreak of war in Shanghai, in early 1932, when Japanese 
soldiers met the heroic resistance of the Chinese army in 
street fighting and retaliated by bombing the civilian 
population.
Japanese aggression in Manchuria resulted in 
establishment of the puppet state of Manchuguo, under the 
sponsorship of Japan. However, the top echelons of the U.S. 
government did not perceive Japan as a potential threat to 
world peace until the Marco Polo Bridge incident in 1937, when 
Japan began its massive drive into the heart of China. U.S. 
passivity up to that time was reflected in the scarcity of 
China news in the U.S. press.
Events of enormous consequence for China's future were 
happening throughout the decade of the 1930s. They received 
very little attention in the U.S. press, even though American 
journalists in China were not only documenting them, but 
becoming increasingly involved in them. To some of the older 
correspondents in China, like J.B. Powell and Thomas Millard, 
who wanted a China free and strong for American business, the
14
great threat was Japan, and the most prominent figure on the 
national scene was Chiang Kai-shek, for he seemed to have 
brought some stability to the country, with the financial help 
of the Shanghai business community.
The Sino-Japanese War significantly weakened the very 
foundation of the Nationalists, draining away their resources 
and energies, whereas the Communists took advantage of the 
opportunities and expanded their strength and influence in the 
rural areas.14 Through his paid lobbyists, Chiang enlisted 
abundant military and material support from the United States. 
President Roosevelt sent his envoy, General Joseph Stilwell, 
to China to coordinate the distribution of U.S. military aid 
and to organize Chiang's armies to fight the Japanese. 
Stilwell soon saw a corrupt and incompetent government 
hoarding military aid for the coming civil war.
The American government seemed to be wedded to the 
Chinese Nationalists.15 From Pearl Harbor until V-J Day, the 
American government sought to win Chiang's cooperation in 
defeating Japan. However, Chiang's primary goal was to curtail 
the growth of the Communists. This difference in primary aims 
resulted in increased tension between Chiang and Stilwell. 
Ultimately, Chiang maneuvered to have President Roosevelt 
recall General Stilwell.
14 Paul Gordon Lauren(ed.), The China Hands' Legacy: 
Ethics and Diplomacy (Boulder and London: Westview Press,
1987), p.3.
15 Ibid. , p. 144 .
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In order to maintain political support within the United 
States, Chiang also tried to control the American journalists 
in China by means of censorship. As the Japanese advanced, 
Chiang moved to the remote fortress city of Chungking in 
Sichuan Province. There, any story about the Nationalists 
corruption, or articles critical of the Nationalist Chinese 
war effort, would be killed by Chiang's minister of 
information, Hollington Tong, who was also a graduate of 
Missouri's journalism school.
The China beat journalists included Theodore White and 
Annalee Jacoby of Time; Arch Steele of the Chicago Daily News, 
a highly respected veteran who later was regarded as the dean 
of American correspondents in the Far East; Brooks Atkinson 
and Tillman Durdin of The New York Times; Jack Belden of 
International News Service; and Hugh Deane of the Christian 
Science Monitor.16
Being relatively later arrivals on the China scene, these 
journalists were young, idealistic and adventurous. They were 
not city-bound and saw for themselves the misery and chaos of 
rural China. Some of the new journalists, such as Edgar Snow, 
Arch Steele, Tillman Durdin and Harold Isaacs, had actually 
shipped to China on an adventure and then stayed. Steele and 
Durdin eventually became correspondents accredited to major 
U.S. papers. Snow worked for The China Weekly Review, then
16 Charles Hood, "The China Hands' Experience: Journalists 
and Diplomacy," in Lauren, The China Hands' Legacy, pp.157- 
158.
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became a correspondent for the London Daily Telegraph and a 
contributor to the Saturday Evening Post. Harold Issacs and 
Durdin both went to work, upon their arrival in China, for 
Hollington Tong (then editor of the China Press in Shanghai). 
Isaacs soon quit, travelled up the Yangtze River, and became 
a dedicated muckraker, while Durdin joined The New York 
Times.17
Agnes Smedley, another journalist, took up first the 
cause of persecuted Chinese urban intellectuals of the late 
1920s and early 1930s, and later the cause of the Chinese 
Communists. Smedley, Issacs, Snow, and his wife, Nym Wales, 
whom he had met in Shanghai in 1931 and married in 1932, were 
all China advocates in the tradition of Thomas Millard. One 
way or another they all went to bat for the Chinese, as 
Millard had done. They all eventually wrote important books 
about China, and, like Millard, they were all put to use by 
their Chinese friends. Millard's connections were Republican 
Chinese of an earlier day. Millard was still in China during 
the 1930s, however, working as an advisor to the Nationalists 
in Nanjing.
Americans were of special value to the Communist cause 
because they could work in China under the protection of 
extraterritoriality, outside Chinese jurisdiction. Isaacs, 
with the encouragement of Mme. Sun Yat-sen, exposed the
17 Lee, Voices of China, p. 209.
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Nationalists' terror through his publication China Forum, 
which received most of its material from underground Chinese 
Communists. Mme. Sun was said to have acted as the liaison 
between the Communists and Edgar Snow, and helped to arrange 
Snow's trip to the Communist headquarters in the Shaanxi 
Province, in 193 6, which resulted in Red Star Over China. The 
book brought the first impressions of Mao's Communist movement 
to those outside of China.
This period was also connected with the name of Henry 
Luce, publisher and editor of the Time magazine. Luce was 
romantic about Chiang, his wife Soong Mei-ling, and the 
Nationalist movement. Luce was strongly opinionated about 
China and Chiang Kai-shek in particular. Through his foreign 
editor, Whittaker Chambers, Luce routinely altered dispatches 
of Time's correspondents, Annalee Jacoby and Theodore White. 
Jacoby later recalled that her stories and interviews in Time 
were doctored. Her interviews with major Chinese figures 
contained questions that she did not ask and answers nobody 
ever gave her.18
The image that Luce created was of a heroic China under 
the valiant leadership of Chiang fighting the Japanese for the 
United States. This impression of the Nationalists given by 
Luce and his journals, Time and Life. influenced many 
Americans. It also influenced President Roosevelt, who 
insisted on giving Nationalist China a place among the Big
18 MacKinnon, China Reporting, pp. 138-139.
18
Four Powers.19
While alienated by the censorship of Chiang and Luce, the 
U.S. reporters enjoyed relatively good relationships with Chou 
En-lai, the charismatic Communist spokesman in Chungking, and 
his beautiful press attache, Gong Peng. The superior public 
relations of the Chou can be vividly illustrated by the way he 
courted the U.S. reporters. According to Durdin, Chou En-lai 
would say to Americans, "One of my top personalities in 
history is Thomas Jefferson. One of my aspirations is to go to 
the United States someday, and please come to Yenan and see 
us. "20
The majority of American journalists had come to China 
predisposed to be suspicious of Communists. But once they 
stayed in China for some time, they found that the 
Nationalists were a very unreliable source of information.21 
These journalists found themselves caught in an ethical 
dilemma of whether to report objectively what they witnessed 
in China or to give moral encouragement to the U.S. ally while 
honoring the censorship.
With Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the Sino-Japanese War 
became part of World War II. Nationalist China suddenly became 
an ally of the United States. Since Chiang had been resisting
19 Harrison E. Salisbury, "China Reporting: Red Star to 
Long March," pp.221-222. The paper appeared in Chin-Chuan 
Lee's Voices of China.
20 MacKinnon, China Reporting, p. 85.
21 Lauren, The China Hands' Legacy, p. 164.
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Japanese aggressors for four years, it was widely believed 
that Chiang was a brilliant leader and could fight off the 
Japanese in Asia for the United States. But the American 
journalists on the China beat who knew this was not true found 
it extremely difficult to dissuade the public of the fantasy. 
These journalists saw the nature of Chiang's regime, and the 
potential of Mao's Communist movement. The Nationalist 
minister of information would delete even the slightest 
criticism of his government.22
While the Nationalist statements could not be trusted, 
the Communist's were always guestionable because there was no 
way to confirm their accounts. So, by 1944, foreign 
correspondents became extremely anxious to see the Communist 
area of the country from which they had been barred for a long 
time. The group that was allowed to visit Yenan in 1944 
included Brooks Atkinson; Theodore H. White; Harrison Forman 
of the New York Herald Tribune; Israel Epstein of Allied Labor 
News and who also reported for The New York Times and Time 
magazine; Gunther Stein of The Christian Science Monitor; 
Father Cormac Shanahan, editor of the Catholic Monthly and 
China Correspondent and correspondent for The Sign; and N. 
Protsenko, China manager of the Tass News Agency.23
The ensuing reports presented a very favorable impression
22 Lauren, The China Hands' Legacy, p. 142.
23 Warren W. Tozer, "The Foreign Correspondents' Visit to 
Yenan in 1944: A Reassessment," Pacific Historical Review. May 
1972, p. 210.
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of the Communists: their land reclamation, self-sufficiency on 
agricultural production, well-trained troops, democratic 
government, and so on. The reports provoked bitter criticism 
from the Nationalist government of China and its supporters in 
the United States. Some critics have concluded that these 
reporters exhibited strong pro-Communist— or at least, anti- 
Nationalist— bias. As a result, the arguments goes, the 
American public became disillusioned with Chiang Kai-shek's 
Nationalist regime.
Of all who visited Yenan, only Father Cormac Shanahan 
presented a somewhat negative picture of the Communists.24 
Except for the admission that the people in Yenan were well- 
fed and the Communist troops were in good spirits, he said 
that there was no freedom in Yenan and people there were 
strictly controlled. But, Father Shanahan's writings were 
mostly discredited as being too much distorted or full of 
contradictions.25
When the war was over, most China beat journalists faced 
charges of "harming the interests of the United States—  
charges ranging from "poor judgment" and "disloyalty" to 
"sedition" and even "treason."26 These are exactly the same 
charges that Powell faced later when he returned from China in
24 Tozer, "The Foreign Correspondents' Visit to Yenan in 
1944," p. 218.
25 Ibid. , p. 219.
26 Lauren, The China Hands' Legacy, p. 27.
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1953. When the Chinese Communists forced the Nationalists to 
flee to the island of Taiwan and the Korean War broke out, 
McCarthyism emerged as an important political force in 
America. Named after former U.S. senator, Joseph McCarthy, 
McCarthyism refers to the Communist hysteria that many believe 
he helped foment during the early 1950s. Those journalists who 
has written favorable reports about the Communists found 
themselves under enormous pressure. Theodore White was 
charged with losing China to the Reds and Annalee Jacoby was 
charged with being a "Communist." John William Powell was 
accused of betraying America's cause in the Far East.
When McCarthyism abated in the United States, 
journalists who had been identified as security risks had that 
stigma removed by the government. But for some of them, their 
reputations as journalists were ruined. Mac Fisher, who had 
been a reporter for United Press in Chungking, was later 
barred from holding any decision-making positions in the 
United States Information Agency. John W. Powell lost his 
journalism career and had to turn to renovating Victorian 
houses in San Francisco. Today, most of the reporters still 
think they did a pretty good job covering China. Steele later 
said: " We reported things as we saw them. What we saw was
that the Nationalists were in chaotic disarray and the 
Communists were winning the war. This wasn't pro-Communist 
reporting. It was objective reporting.1,27
27 Hood, "The China Hand's Experience," p. 167.
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About forty years later, these old China Hands 
journalists had the chance again to gather together at 
Scottsdale, Arizona, for the conference— "War Reporting: China 
in the 1940s." The meeting was the brainchild of two 
University of Arizona history professors. When these veteran 
war reporters were again asked the guestion of whether they 
were biased in favor of the Chinese Communists, the answer was 
"No." They were all aware, they said, of efforts by both the 
Nationalists and the Communists to manipulate them and that 
they were skeptical of both parties and reported what they saw 
and knew.28
After the Communists took over the mainland and the 
Nationalists fled to the island of Taiwan, the relationship 
worsened between the new nation— the People's Republic of 
China— on the mainland, and the United States. The hostility 
culminated in the Korean War in the early 1950s. After 1949, 
only one paper, Powell's The China Weekly Review, continued 
its presence in China under the new regime. The paper soon 
became embroiled in controversy over its coverage of the early 
Communist regime and the Korean War.
28 MacKinnon, China Reporting, p. 149.
Chapter Three. The China Weekly Review and the Powells
1. J.B. Powell and the Review 
John William Powell was born in Shanghai in 1919, where
his father edited The China Weekly Review, a respected English 
language journal of news and opinion about Chinese affairs. 
John W. Powell came to the United States when he was a little 
over one year old, and returned to China at the age of six. In 
1927, when Chiang Kai-shek moved against the Communists and 
took the city of Shanghai, Powell's father sent him and his 
sister, Martha, to the United States, where he went to school 
in Hannibal and Columbia, Missouri. He was mainly reared in 
the United States.
After graduation from high school in 1938, Powell studied 
at the University of Missouri School of Journalism, from which 
his father graduated as a member of its first journalism
class. In the fall 1940, he decided to take a break from 
school and went back to Shanghai in 1941 to work for The China 
Press. an English language newspaper owned by one of Chiang 
Kai-shek's closest associates, H.H. Kung. He did mostly
general reporting and rewrite work. During the evenings, he 
worked for his father's magazine, The China Weekly Review.
After staying less than a year in China, Powell came back 
to the United States and continued his education at the 
Missouri School of Journalism. He had altogether three years 
of journalism education, but was never graduated from college. 
He wanted to join the military when the United States entered
23
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World War II. However, poor eyesight kept him from doing so. 
Instead, he joined the government, first working with the 
Federal Communications Commission, and then as a news editor 
with the Office of War Information. After working in 
Washington and New York for a year, he was assigned in 1943 to 
Chungking to work with the press and psychological warfare 
services. He dropped leaflets out of army bombers over 
occupied Hong Kong and Canton.1
Shortly after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the Japanese 
had arrested Powell's father, J.B. Powell, and put him into 
prison, where he suffered frostbite on his feet. In 1945 when 
the Japanese surrendered, the elder Powell was too ill to 
return to China from the United States, so Powell left OWI and 
assumed control of the Review.
The journal had been first founded by Thomas Millard, 
the pioneer American journalist in China, who named it 
Millard's Review of the Far East. The first issue of 
Millard's magazine came out on June 9, 1917. Millard used the 
journal to try to break with the colonial convention of 
ignoring native news and to rebut allegations that might 
injure China's national prestige and credit.2 In 1922, when 
Millard began to advise the Chinese government full time, he 
sold the magazine to his editor, J.B. Powell.
1 Powell interview, March 19-2 3, 1993 in San Francisco.
2 Hamilton, "The Missouri News Monopoly and American 
Altruism," p.34.
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The elder Powell had edited the Review since 1917. He had 
been teaching at the Missouri School of Journalism when 
Millard cabled Dean Williams to recommend an editor. It was 
the first transoceanic telegram that J.B. Powell had ever 
seen. Throughout the years he spent in China, J.B. Powell and 
his wife lived simply, dressed casually and befriended all 
kinds of people, even those who disagreed with them.
One of the first things he did as the owner of the 
magazine was to change its name, Millard's Review of the Far 
East. because he thought that it "too restrictive and 
personal."3 He experimented with several names, the first 
being The Weekly Review of the Far East, and finally in June 
1923, The China Weekly Review was adopted. Interestingly, 
considering the special importance and respect Chinese usually 
give to established names, J.B. Powell continued to use the 
paper's original Chinese language name— Millard's Review of 
the Far East. Except for the title which was in both English 
and Chinese, the content of the journal was in English only.
J.B. Powell established the Review in the style of the 
New Republic of Walter Lippmann and Herbert Croly, which was 
then regarded as the most attractive journal in America.4 He 
pretty much kept Millard's independent, anti-imperialist, and 
pro-China approach. Most of the readers were young Chinese




intellectuals, students of mission and municipal schools, who 
were very concerned with international issues. Then there was 
the Anglo-American community in Shanghai, which numbered 
around 10,000. Other readers included Shanghai-based 
Scandinavians, Frenchmen, Germans, and Russians.
J.B. Powell did not like Communism and sided with the 
Nationalists when they began to expand their zone of control. 
He maintained a steady defense of the Nationalists, often 
citing American history to boost his points. When Chiang's 
military units occupied missionary schools and property, the 
Review noted that William and Mary College had been occupied 
by American, British and French forces during the American 
revolution and by the Confederate and Union troops during the 
American Civil War.
"America became politically independent at the close of 
the revolution against Great Britain," the Review said on 
Sept. 8, 1928, "but did not become financially and
economically independent from Europe until quite recently."5 
The rationalization was that it would take time for the 
Nationalists to develop their country, especially in face of 
Japanese intrusions and domestic turmoil.
J.B. Powell realized that Chiang was a authoritarian 
leader, and the Nationalists' corruption and press censorship 
seriously disturbed him. However, even when the Communists 
began to receive favorable coverage from others in the mid-
5 The China Weekly Review. Sept. 8, 1928.
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193 0s, he did not give much attention to them. In 1945, he 
wrote in Reader's Digest that Chiang was moving toward a 
democratic republic.
However, as evidence of his interest in providing both 
sides of an issue, he would regularly run stories in the 
Review by pro-Communist radicals like Agnes Smedley and Anna 
Louise Strong, with whom he disagreed, and gave the Review a 
reputation as the chief forum in China for open debate and
free exchange of information.6
Under J.B. Powell's stewardship, the Review hammered at 
foreign powers to give up their spheres of influence in China. 
He called on them to relinquish their railway and mining
rights, and to remove their troops. He saw the United States
as having a special role in modernizing China. He wrote in the 
Review in 1921: "In Practical American terms, the Open Door in 
China means a first rate anti-trust law for China." He said: 
"I have developed a profound confidence in the good common 
sense of the Chinese people and in their ability to unify and 
develop their country if given half a chance."7
J.B. Powell's open criticism of Japanese militarism in 
China seriously endangered him in the late 193 0s. The Japanese 
closed the Review's office on Dec. 8, 1941 shortly after they 
occupied Shanghai. A few days later, the Japanese put J.B.
6 Hamilton. "The Missouri News Monopoly and American 
Altruism," p.36.
7 The China Weekly Review. Nov. 5, 1921.
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Powell into jail in Shanghai, where he suffered terribly. In 
the end, his feet were amputated because of frost-bite. He was 
repatriated to the United States in August 194 2 and was taken 
to the Columbia University Medical Center in New York where he 
remained until May 1945. While in the hospital, he received 
considerable help from friends and admirers to help pay his 
mounting bills: $10,000 personally from Chiang Kai-shek,
another $1,000 from the Nationalist government, $3,6 00 from 
Chinese newsmen and some $10,000 from American journalists.8
J.B. Powell spent the recuperation period writing and 
learning to walk on artificial feet. He planned to return to 
China to run the Review, but was never able to make it. In 
194 6, he went to Japan to testify at the war crimes trial in 
Tokyo, despite his fragile health. He collapsed and died in 
1947 after addressing a University of Missouri alumni luncheon 
in Washington, D.C. He was a strong supporter of Chiang and 
the Nationalists to the last.9
2. The Review Under John W. Powell 
After four years of suspension, The China Weekly Review 
finally resumed publication with Powell in charge. The first 
issue of the new Review bears the date Oct. 20, 1945. When
Powell and the Review's old staff returned to the paper's 
office at 113 Avenue Edward VII (today's Yenan Road) in




Shanghai, they found that the previous Japanese occupants had 
thoroughly looted the place. However, the staff members were 
extremely happy to be back in Shanghai and doing business at 
the same place. The paper stated that it would aim at the same 
high standards of journalism and to follow the same basic 
principles of truth and accuracy as those established in 1917 
by its founders, Thomas Millard and J.B. Powell.10
During the Chinese civil war, the Review featured 
articles on the internal struggle in China, the developing 
Cold War, domestic insurrections in Indochina and Malaya, and 
trade problems. Powell began to build the journal's 
circulation and develop a reputation as a journalist by 
broadening the paper's scope with articles by Chinese and 
American contributors and expressing criticism of the 
inefficiency, cruelty, corruption, and press censorship of 
Chiang's Nationalist government. He tried to steer a middle 
course between the Nationalists and the Communists. In its 
editorial on Nov. 24, 1945, Powell wrote:
We feel that the usual answer that the Chinese people 
are still not yet organized to handle democracy is just so 
much political eye-wash. No one is qualified to say whether 
the Chinese people are capable to handle democracy or not 
until the Chinese people are given a chance to try it out. We 
are inclined to think that both the Kuomintang (Nationalists) 
and the Communists are apt to under-estimate the political 
maturity of the Chinese people. ... We propose that both 
Kuomintang and the Communists take this chance to demonstrate 
fully and without further delay that they are prepared to put 
their democratic aspiration into actual practice.11
10 The China Weekly Review. Oct. 20, 1945.
11 The China Weekly Review. Nov. 24, 1945.
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In 1947, Powell defied Chiang's censorship and reported 
the Nationalists' massacre of about 5,000 people on the island 
of Taiwan, which was torn by revolt on the eve of the 
Nationalist occupation. On March 30, 1947, The New York Times 
reporter Tillman Durdin wrote: "An American weekly magazine, 
The China Weekly Review, today was the first publication in 
the country to give a full story of the recent tragic events 
in the island. The Review carries a detailed account, written 
by John W. Powell, the publisher, who has just returned from 
a week's visit to the island."12 After the story came out, 
major U.S. newspapers referred to Powell as a "fearless" and 
lauded him as "one of the best-informed newspapermen on China 
conditions." 13
Powell harshly criticized MacArthur's Japanese policy to 
restore to power the conservative political and economic 
groups. He also turned his editorial attention to the United 
States itself, criticizing the House Un-American Activities 
Committee, the affinity of some policy makers and politicians 
for Chiang, and what he saw as the growing diplomatic 
intransigence of the United States vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. 
Meanwhile, the paper regularly carried ads for the National
12 The New York Times. March 30, 1947.
13 Lauren, The China Hands Legacy, p. 29.
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City Bank, Pan American, Ford and other American 
corporations.14
As Chiang's forces retreated and the Chinese Communists 
took over Shanghai in 1949, the Review published an optimistic 
front-page editorial on May 28. It stated: "This publication 
has been a consistent critic of the corruption, exploitation 
and ineptitude that has characterized the Nationalist regime, 
particularly in the post-war years. We therefore welcome the 
change that has come about and hope that the arrival of the 
People's Liberation Army will mark the beginning of a new era 
in which the people of China can now begin to enjoy the 
benefits of good government. The new authorities have an 
immense task ahead of them in reconstructing the country and 
in reorganizing its social structure. We wish them well and 
will endeavor to reflect honestly and fairly the development 
of the new China."15 It the following issues, it also 
published laudatory reports of conditions in the Communist- 
held regions. Associate editor Julian Schuman ventured 120 
miles from Shanghai to report that Communist rule was pleasant 
and efficient in contrast to the harshness of the 
Nationalists.
A year earlier, however, the Review had editorially 
disparaged Communist claims that the United States was spying
14 Stanley I. Kutler, The American Inquisition. Justice 
and Injustice in the Cold War (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982) , 
p. 219.
15 The China Weekly Review. May 28, 1949.
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in their territory. In its Nov. 20, 1948 editorial, the Review 
said: "... The claims of the Communists to the effect that the 
US is establishing a spy net in Asia equipped with radio 
locators, etc. becomes a bit ridiculous. For a realistic 
outfit, such statements seem even more out of place. If the 
Chinese Communists really believe this story, they appear more 
gullible than we had imagined them to be. If they don't 
believe it and are using the story purely for propaganda 
purposes, which seems to us more than likely, they are toying 
with the truth, which is something impossible to justify."16
After Shanghai was taken over by the Communist troops, 
the subscriptions of the Review went down significantly from 
their peak of about 10,000 and advertising revenue also went 
down dramatically. With economic difficulties and most parts 
of the country under the control of the new regime, Powell 
thought about closing the paper. However, encouraged by many 
Chinese and American friends and readers who wanted to get 
reliable news about China, Powell decided to continue. Most of 
the American subscribers were former China missionaries, 
businessmen interested in China, and universities across the 
United States.
Powell's criticism of Chiang's Nationalists and his 
sympathy for the Communist government did not go unnoticed in 
Washington. In September 1949, U.S. Passport Office Chief Ruth 
Shipley refused to renew Powell's passport, saying that
16 The China Weekly Review. Nov. 20, 1948.
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Powell's publication was pro-Chinese Communist. The passport 
official also labeled Powell's wife, Sylvia, a "Communist 
Propagandist" after she praised the "new order" in Shanghai 
and criticized in a Portland newspaper American support for 
Chiang's Nationalist party.17
Other U.S. officials also expressed disapproval of the 
Powells. The American Consulate in Shanghai complained in 1949 
that the Powells were among a group of Americans who tended to 
lean away from the principles of U.S. government policy and 
had caused considerable trouble. The various reports 
complained that Powell's editorials and articles were 
decidedly "Pink."18
By 1950, Shanghai had a total of four foreign-owned 
publications, down from seven before 194 9. The only closures
of foreign publications were due to poor business. In July,
limited circulation and the loss in revenues prompted Powell 
again to consider closing the Review. But a few weeks later, 
he dropped the idea, deciding instead to change the magazine 
to a monthly called The China Monthly Review. With the Korean 
War going on, Powell considered it necessary to preserve the 
magazine as a forum to challenge the United States' 
"adventuristic policy" in Korea.19
Powell subsidized the journal with operating a
17 Kutler, The American Inquisition, pp. 219-221.
18 Ibid. , p. 220.
19 The China Weekly Review. August 5, 1950.
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translation service and putting out two other publications. 
Every day, the Review would put together a ten-to-twelve-page 
translation of China's economic regulations and items of trade 
and commercial interest, and distribute it to the foreign 
business community in Shanghai. At the end of each month, 
Powell published a "Monthly Report" on the situation in China 
and an economic magazine, which turned out to be short-lived. 
He sold them to the head offices of large foreign firms. 
Another book periodically published by the Review was Who's 
Who in China. These efforts proved quite profitable and helped 
finance the Review's whole operation.
The Review was printed by Millingtons, a British-owned 
press in China; Powell bought his own newsprint on the open 
market. Foreign distribution was handled through the mail to 
places such the United States, Britain, Australia, Canada, 
India and Southeast Asia. The Review was also available on 
newsstands in China. Powell did not handle distribution, but 
instead concentrated on editorial tasks. A typical day for him 
was checking local press for news leads, sending staff to 
cover events and writing the editorial. Sometimes he would 
travel, covering important events himself.20
The revamped Review reflected the concerns of 
revolutionary China. Articles described the building of new 
sewer lines in Shanghai, tax reform, the abolition of labor
20 The China Weekly Review. August 5, 1950, and Powell
interview, March 19-23, 1993.
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corruption, government assumption of YMCA activities, and the 
new relationships between foreigners and Chinese. Most of the 
articles were written by the Review's editors, correspondents 
and independent contributors. It routinely used foreign and 
Chinese sources such as The New York Times. Time, the British 
news agency Reuters, the New China News Agency, and two 
Chinese newspapers, The Ta Kuncr Pao and The Wen Wei Pao. 
Opinions from the Chinese press went under the column titled 
"Chinese Press Opinion." Sometimes the Review would carry full 
texts of speeches made by Chinese leaders such as Liu Shao- 
chi, Chen Yun, Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai and others.
When the Review was criticized by Walter Simmons, then 
the Chicago Tribune's Tokyo correspondent, for being a 
Communist publication, Powell counterattacked by saying that 
the smearing had been a desire to cash in on the then-popular 
anti-red hysteria in America, an attempt to grab the 
headlines. He said that, because of the Review's "accurate and 
objective" reporting, new subscriptions from out of China had 
increased substantially.21
Following the outbreak of the Korean War in June of 1950, 
and especially after the Chinese intervention in November, the 
Review offered strident attacks on the American conduct of the 
war and its policy toward the People's Republic of China. It 
was this reporting of the Korean war, specifically his 
allegations concerning the use of germ warfare on the part of
21 The China Weekly Review. March 25, 1950.
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the U.S. armies, that got Powell into his most serious trouble 
with the U.S. government. The trouble culminated in a sedition 
charge brought against him after he and his wife, Sylvia, 
returned to the United States in August 1953.
Chapter Four. The Review's Coverage of the Korean War
When the Korean War broke out in 1950, the Review 
criticized U.S. involvement. Its editorials charged that the 
UN sanction supporting intervention was unjustly adopted, 
because the U.S. government used its economic powers to sway 
the votes and because large countries like China and India 
were not fully represented in the UN. It published stories and 
photos of American POWs in North Korea, purportedly protesting 
the war. The Review also printed lists of alleged violations 
of the Korean-Chinese border by U.S. aircraft. Powell 
contended that the conflict was a Korean civil war, and that 
any extension of it would be criminal, as it would only bring 
more suffering and destruction to more people, including the 
American troops. After the Chinese troops joined North Korea 
in the war, Powell criticized the U.S. policy of bringing 
economic sanctions against China.
The Review's January 1951 issue charged that U.S. planes 
had carried out "systematic bombing, strafing and 
reconnaissance flights over China's northeastern provinces."1 
Then, in February, Powell quoted The Chicago Daily News. 
Newsweek. The Christian Science Monitor. The Nippon Times, and 
Guancfmincr Daily to report that the United States was using 
Japanese troops in Korea. The Review also used The London 
Times. Reuters, The London Daily Mirror, and the British 
magazine Picture Post in reporting the atrocities allegedly
1 The China Monthly Review. January 1951.
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committed by the regime of South Korea's Syngman Rhee. In the 
editorial titled "Rearming of Japan," Powell said:
The Truman administration has cast all pretenses to the 
winds and is now openly rearming Japan, in spite of the fact 
that Japan is technically still an enemy nation and is 
governed by military occupation and in spite of the fact that 
this is a complete violation of all Allied wartime and postwar 
agreements governing Japan.... The old Japanese thought police 
have been restored, while freedom of the press is non­
existent. More than 1,000 progressive publications have been 
suppressed by the reactionary Yoshida regime acting on the 
orders of MacArthur2
Meanwhile, the Review reported on the low morale of the 
American troops. It said:
Despite the tight censorship and the cooperation of most 
correspondents, reports of the low morale of US troops slip 
through in occasional letters and press dispatches. For 
example, a press agency dispatch from New York on March 23 
reported that The Chicago Daily News correspondents in Korea 
as saying that nothing would boost the morale of the troops 
"more than evacuation home." Soldiers, the correspondent 
added, "see but one way home— on stretchers."3
After General MacArthur was dismissed on April 1951, 
Powell used figures from Hsinhua, the New China News Agency, 
and Reuters to report that the UN forces had suffered heavy 
losses in Korea. However, he also reported the U.S. Defense 
Department's own U.S. casualty figure.4
Starting in June 1951, the Review began its features on 
POWS, using the New China News Agency as the main source. 
Excerpts of Peking Radio (now Radio Beijing) broadcasts made
2 The China Monthly Review, April 1951.
3 Ibid.
4 The China Monthly Review. May and June, 1951.
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by POWs to their American families were reprinted. Photos of 
happy, well-fed and well-clothed U.S. POWs were published to 
counter the "officially-inspired reports in the American press 
that U.S. prisoners are being mistreated by their Korean and 
Chinese captors."5 This contrasted with the Review's reports 
that American captors maltreated Chinese and Korean POWs and 
tattooed their bodies with anti-Communist slogans. It carried 
names, serial numbers, ranks, units or addresses of U.S. POWs 
to notify relatives. Meanwhile, the magazine made clear that 
the names of the POWs were not official, but were compiled by 
the Review's own editors from the New China News Agency 
dispatches and local newspapers. It also noted that many of 
the prisoners had given their names and messages to 
corespondents of the New China News Agency during interviews 
so that their families at home might know they were safe.6
After the cease-fire talk started in July 1951 between 
the warring parties, the Review continued to criticize the 
U.S. government, charging the United States with stalling the 
negotiations and the exchange of POW lists. In August, after 
U.S. forces launched an offensive against the Chinese and the 
North Koreans, the Review commented that the action had 
backfired and was designed to prolong the Korean war. While 
censorship kept most of the Western press silent on the 




to allege that the United States lost nearly 20,000 soldiers 
in less than a month.
The coverage of the Korean War took a dramatic turn in 
early 19 52 when North Korea and China charged that the United 
States was engaged in germ warfare against their troops and 
civilians. In February 1952, North Korean Foreign Minister Bak 
Hun Yung protested to the United Nations about the use of 
bacteriological weapons on the part of the U.S. forces in 
Korea. The China Monthly Review's editorial responded harshly, 
saying that the American invaders, "proceeding in a vein which 
surpassed the savagery of Hitler Germany and Hirohito Japan in 
the last war, by a systematic spreading of smallpox, cholera 
and plague germs over North Korea," have committed a "crime 
against humanity." The same editorial, citing Newsweek and 
North Korean officials, traced the record of American 
preparation and use of bacteriological weapons in Korea. The 
editorial concluded that the use of germ warfare was a trick 
by the Americans to obstruct the truce talks and to 
indiscriminately annihilate the Korean and Chinese people. 
Based on the report by the North Korean foreign minister, the 
Review recounted alleged instances of U.S. forces spreading 
large guantities of bacteria-carrying insects by planes over 
North Korea and the Chinese front-line positions.7
The Review also charged that the Americans had used
7 The China Monthly Review. November 1951, and March
1952 .
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prisoners of war for experimental purposes and had 
collaborated with Japanese bacteriological war criminals, who, 
through U.S. pressure, had been freed in 1950 of charges of 
conducting such warfare in China during World War II. "The 
true face of American imperialism has once more been bared," 
it said. " The men who are carrying out Wall Street's war in 
Korea are using the savage methods practiced by the German 
and Japanese criminals in the last war. Like their 
predecessors, they will be held accountable for their crimes 
against peace and humanity." 8
In April 1952, the Review reported the United States had 
extended its bacteriological warfare from Korea to China. 
Pictures, ostensibly of U.S. germ bombs, and of bacteria- 
carrying insects and flies dropped in China occupied several 
pages. It reported an announcement by Chinese Foreign Minister 
Chou En-lai that germ-laden insects had been released by U.S. 
planes over Northeast China. It quoted Chou En-lai as stating 
that American aviators who flew over China and used 
bacteriological weapons would, on capture, be dealt with as 
war criminals. The Review therefore commented:
Actually there is no way for (Secretary of State Dean) 
Acheson or the US government to evade responsibility for this 
attempt at wholesale extermination of civilians. The evidence 
gathered in Korea and China is overwhelming. The plain fact of 
the matter is that Washington, stopped short in its aggression 
in Korea and compelled to sit down and talk cease-fire terms, 
has now shown its real countenance to the whole world. This 
criminal action is the product of men bereft of their sanity
8 The China Monthly Review. March 1952.
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and is the sequel to the no less horrible crimes carried out 
by the Nazis. The use of germ warfare is a clear-cut violation 
of international law— specifically of the Geneva Convention of
June 17, 1952 It is already late but there is still time
for the American people to put a stop to these crimes against 
humanity which are being committed in their name. And there is 
still time for the individual soldier to make that 'moral 
choice' which the Allies so recently declared to be his 
personal responsibility.9
In the following months, germ warfare became an important
subject and the Review carried a series of articles detailing
America's research in bacteriological weapons. American 
sources included the New York Journal-American. Life. The New 
York Times. Newsweek, Science Illustrated, Saturday Evening 
Post, Atlantic Monthly. Reader's Digest, and some books 
published in America. Also used were the New China News Agency 
and the Central News Agency of Korea.10
In May 1952, the Review reported that the U.S. engagement
in germ warfare had been fully proved by a group of lawyers, 
journalists, and doctors who visited areas where U.S. planes 
had allegedly dropped infected insects. Specifically, the 
group was made of lawyers from Austria, Belgium, Brazil, 
Britain, China, France, Italy, and Poland; a team of Korean, 
Chinese, and foreign correspondents; and Chinese medical and 
scientific workers. According to the Review. this 
international group had personally examined remains of germ 
bombs, infected insects and the material used to spread the 
lethal germs.
9 The China Monthly Review. April 1952.
10 The China Monthly. May and June 1952.
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From July 1952 to the magazine's closing a year later in 
July 1953, almost every issue of the Review reported that U.S. 
POWs had been inoculated against infection in the U.S. Army 
and were involved in germ warfare, and that they wanted peace 
and an end to war. Names, ranks, and serial numbers of these 
POWs were also provided. The Review called these admissions by 
U.S. POWs "the final link in the chain of evidence before the 
world showing the U.S. government guilty of launching germ 
warfare.,,n
As evidence of U.S. germ warfare in Korea and China, the 
Review compiled the following international sources which did 
on-the-spot investigation to prove the credibility of its 
reporting:12
1) A six-man group of journalists from Korea, China and 
Hong Kong, London, Paris, Budapest, and Warsaw.
2) A group of well-known jurists from Austria, Belgium, 
Brazil, Britain, China, France, Italy, and Poland. Five of the 
eight-man group were non-Communists.
3) A group of Chinese medical and scientific workers 
which included Dr. Mei Ju-ao, China's member of the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East, which tried 
major Japanese war criminals after VJ day.
4) Dr. James Endicott, a Canadian missionary in China for
11 The China Monthly Review. July 1952.
12 The China Monthly Review. October 1952.
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2 0 years. He visited China in spring 1952 and investigated 
areas purportedly affected by germ warfare.
5) Dr. Hewlett Johnson, England's Dean of Canterbury. He 
spent 40 days in China summer 1952 and inspected the evidence 
of germ warfare and interviewed Chinese Christian leaders who 
also investigated the charges.
6) The International Scientific Commission for 
Investigation of the Facts concerning Bacteriological Warfare 
in Korea and China, which, after more than two months of 
investigation, concluded that the peoples of Korea and China 
has indeed been the targets of U.S. bacteriological weapons.
7) Numerous captured U.S. POWs admitted dropping germ­
laden bombs over Korea and POWs testifying the spreading of 
germ warfare against U.S. prisoners of war in Korea.
The International Scientific Commission included such 
well-know scientists as Dr. Joseph Needham, a Cambridge 
University bio-chemist and embryologist at that time. The 
commission put together a 300,000-word report with the 
following conclusion:
The peoples of Korea and China have indeed been the 
objectives of bacteriological weapons. These have been 
employed by units of the USA armed forces, using a great 
variety of different methods for the purpose, some of which 
seem to be developments of those applied by the Japanese army 
during the second world war.
The Commission reached these conclusions, passing from 
one logical step to another. It did so reluctantly because its 
members had not been disposed to believe that such an inhuman 
technique could have been put into execution in the face its 
universal condemnation by the peoples of the nations.13
13 The China Monthly Review. Nov.-Dec. 1952.
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Besides covering the Korea War, the Review continued to 
report the domestic situation in China. Most of its editorials 
commented on the progress and success of the new republic. 
Headlines included "Food Problem Solved," "Production 
Miracle," "Victory on the Economic Front," "Peasants' Taxes 
Lowered," "Victory Over Famine," and "Science in New China."
The American media published the germ-warfare charges 
made by China and Korea, but readily dismissed them as typical 
Communist propaganda. Newsweek characterized the charges as "a 
world wide epidemic of Red propaganda," and it quoted U.S. 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson as saying that the charges 
reflected "the inability of the Communists to care for the 
health of the people."14 Newsweek also listed four reasons 
for the Communist propaganda: (1) to distract their people
from some major concessions they were going to make at 
Panmunjom. (2) to build up a highly emotional pretext for 
breaking off the truce talks, and to rally their war-weary 
peoples. (3) to frighten their peoples into taking proper 
health precautions against the epidemics then prevalent in 
China and Korea.15 As for Dr. James Endicott, a Canadian 
missionary to China, who was reported to have found evidence 
of America being involved in germ warfare, Newsweek countered 
that he was Canada's best-known apologist for Russia and was
14 Newsweek. March 17, 1952, p. 43.
15 Newsweek. April 7, 1952, p. 40.
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invited to China just to spout the germ-warfare propaganda.16
After the International Scientific Commission for the 
Investigation of the Facts Concerning Bacterial Warfare in 
Korea and China publicized its report, Time called the 
contents ridiculous and unscientific, and reported that the 
scientists all had strong pro-Communist leanings. The magazine 
quoted U.S. officials as saying that the germ-warfare charges 
were a "monstrous and incredible Big Lie."17 Time reported 
that the International Scientific Commission conducted no 
scientific tests and it also discredited the testimony of Dean 
Hewlett Johnson with regard to the germ warfare and called him 
"the Red Dean."18
The New York Times labeled the charges as propaganda too. 
Before publishing germ warfare photos of People's Daily of 
China, The New York Times asked military and scientific 
experts to verify their truthfulness. The experts concluded 
that the deadly bugs in the pictures were harmless insects 
incapable of carrying diseases; photos of bacteria were either 
fakes, photos of innocuous bacteria or meaningless blotches; 
and the "germ bomb" supposedly dropped by the United States 
was a picture of a nonexplosive bomb used to distribute
16 Newsweek. May 12, 1952, p. 54.
17 Time. May 19, 1952, pp. 23-24.




19 The New York Times. April 1, 1953.
Chapter Five. The Sedition Trial of John William Powell
During its eight years of publication after World War II, 
the Review suffered economic problems. In June 1953, the 
Powells decided that they could no longer absorb the journal's 
increasingly heavy losses. Powell complained that the 
Nationalist blockade of the China coast, the U.S. post 
office's periodic interference with the mail between China and 
America, Washington's trade embargo upon China and the open 
prohibition of the Review in some countries had forced its 
closure. Nevertheless, Powell expressed satisfaction that his 
magazine had survived as long as it did, and that it had 
served its readers well. He said that the Review had made a 
"worthwhile contribution in presenting the facts about the new 
China, in telling the exciting and important story of the new 
civilization" sprouting in the new land.1
In the Review's farewell issue in July 1953, Powell wrote 
that China had made more progress in the past four years than 
ever before, and that the Chinese people had taken their 
destiny into their own hands. The Powells and their two sons 
left Shanghai for the United States in August 1953.
Washington was aware of the return of the Powells to the 
United States. The State Department, CIA, and FBI had kept 
track of Powell's movements, including his visits to friends 
in the United States. A CIA agent in Hong Kong warned his
1 The China Monthly Review. June 1953.
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superiors that Powell could become an effective propagandist 
for the Chinese regime in view of his "superficial, plausible 
way of putting things."2 Upon yhr Powells' return, the 
Customs Service Office held the luggage, including nearly 
2,000 books from the Review library, because the library 
contained publications and films of a "political nature," and 
because they had physically been to Communist China. Actually, 
the majority of the books were published in the United States 
and Britain. They included the New Testament and Thomas 
Hardy's Jude The Obscure. Finally, Powell had to hire a lawyer 
and managed to get the books released in 1961, eight years 
after their arrival in the United States, on the condition 
that he paid the storage fees.3
After he returned, Powell, not fully aware of the extent 
of the anti-Communist hysteria developing in his home country, 
continued to praise the improved living conditions in China. 
In an interview with the Portland Oregonian. Powell said the 
average Chinese was better off under the Communists than under 
the Nationalists. He said that America's policy of isolating 
China had not worked and that other countries such as Britain 
and France had benefitted much from increased trade with 
China. Powell also said his observations of conditions were 
not limited to the narrow confines of Shanghai and that he and
2 Kutler, The American Inquisition, p. 223.
3 "A Journalist's Retrospective," by John W. Powell in 
The China Hands Legacy, pp. 147-148.
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his wife, Sylvia, had travelled fairly widely in China.4
The FBI thought Powell's statements warranted prosecution 
and asked the Justice Department to take immediate action. 
Officials with the Justice Department's Criminal Division 
agreed that Powell's writings were "replete with half truths, 
distortions, and shadings of truth" and even absurdities. But 
they found that Powell's statements offered no basis for 
prosecution because it was impossible to demonstrate their 
falsity. The FBI's efforts to verify the truthfulness of 
Powell's statements about U.S. germ warfare operations were 
repeatedly rebuffed by various government agencies on grounds 
of confidentiality.5
Finally, in September 1954, thirteen months after he had 
returned home, Powell was summoned to Washington, D.C., to 
testify before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, 
chaired by Indiana Republican Senator William Jenner. Sen. 
Jenner said the subcommittee believed that certain American 
individuals had conspired to propagandize the American public 
on behalf of the "brainwashing, soul-killing Red Chinese." 
These Americans, according to Sen. Jenner, included John K. 
Fairbank, John Stewart Service and John Paton Davies, who 
"formed a little cluster in Shanghai around a once "honorable 
publication, The China Weekly, and later Monthly Review." Sen.
4 The Oregonian. Sept. 30, 1953.
5 Kutler, The American Inquisition, pp. 222-225.
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Jenner called the Review an instrument by which the group 
"advertized and brazenly proclaimed devotion" to China.6
The subcommittee's hearings began with witnesses who had 
allegedly been adversely affected by the Review. Former POWs 
of the Korean War testified that they had been terribly 
maltreated in the hands of the Chinese and North Koreans, and 
that The China Monthly Review was one of the pro-Communist 
publications used by their captors for propaganda and 
compulsory ideological indoctrination. Other publications 
included The Shanghai News, The New York Daily Worker. The 
London Daily Worker, People's World. Masses and Main Stream. 
Political Affairs. The National Guardian, and dozens of other 
Chinese and Russian magazines and books. According to the 
witnesses, although the prisoners' camps were often short of 
food and medicine, truckloads of The China Monthly Review 
always arrived on time. Prisoners were forced to spend an 
average of six to eight hours every day studying articles in 
the Review and that failure to endorse its line had resulted 
in a number of severe punishments and even deaths of 
prisoners.
A prominent case was one involving Mrs. Dolores Gill, 
whose husband, Lt. Charles L. Gill, was captured by the 
Chinese and later died in the prison camps. Mrs. Gill
6 Hearings, Senate Judiciary Subcommittee to Investigate 
the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other 
Internal Security Laws, 83rd Congress, Second Session. 
(September 27, 1954), pp. 1819-1822.
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testified that Powell had written her in January 1951, telling 
her that it was the policy of the Chinese to treat all 
prisoners with "greatest leniency and fairness."7 However, 
after the Korean War, Mrs. Gill learned from her husband's 
fellow prisoners that Lt. Charles L. Gill had died of 
malnutrition and dysentery.
When it was Powell's turn to testify, he freely 
answered questions about his father, J.B. Powell, and his own 
education and employment with the U.S. government. He admitted 
that as editor of the Review, he was fully responsible for the 
contents of the magazine. However, when he was asked about his 
associations, his writings, his belief and the other Americans 
whose names appeared in the magazine, he routinely refused to 
answer, invoking the First Amendment's guarantee of the 
freedom of expression or the Fifth Amendment's provisions 
protecting against self-incrimination.8
After the hearing, Powell held a press conference at the 
National Press Club in Washington, D.C. He said: "I am not a 
Communist, not now and never have been." He added that the 
Review "was not considered pro-Communist by the Communists in 
China." When he was questioned about the germ warfare charges, 
he answered: "Something must have happened there. Something
7 Ibid., p. 1832.
8 Hearings, Subcommittee to Investigate the 
Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Security 
Laws of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 83rd Congress, Second 
Session. (September 27, 1954), pp. 1818-1912.
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sure as heck must have happened up there.” He also said that 
he saw no "evidence” of Americans dying of torture in Korean 
prison camps.9
Powell's press conference upset the subcommittee, and 
Sen. Jenner called Powell "this renegade American,” who he 
said indirectly helped to torture American servicemen. Sen. 
Jenner charged that Powell was travelling freely in the 
country to spread the poison of confusion and defeatism. "It 
is reasonable to believe that John W. Powell is in this 
country to soften up the American people, as he tried to 
soften up our fighting men, so we will agree to trade with the 
Soviet bloc, and keep quiet if Red China is admitted to the 
United Nations,” he said. Meanwhile, Sen. Jenner announced 
that he would submit the hearing transcripts to the Department 
of Justice and ask the Attorney General of the United States 
to immediately press treason charges against Powell.10
The Senate hearings continued in December in San 
Francisco, where the Powells maintained their residence. 
However, when Sen. Herman Welker (R-Idaho) of the subcommittee 
called Powell as the first witness, the editor decided not to 
appear, even though he technically was still under subpoena. 
Instead, he went to stay with a friend in San Francisco while
9 Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee to Investigate 
the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other 
Internal Security Laws, 83rd Congress, Second Session. 
(January 3, 1955), pp. 64-66.
10 Hearing, p. 2018.
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the subcommittee was in the same city. He said he was tired of 
the hearings and same witnesses, and that be believed the 
subcommittee moved the hearings to San Francisco in order to 
embarrass him publicly and to make life difficult for him and 
his family.11
His wife, Sylvia, was then called to testify. A native of 
Oregon and graduate of Reed College in Portland, Sylvia had 
worked as an administrative assistant for the United Nations 
Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) in 
Washington, D.C., and later in Shanghai, China in 1945 and 
1946. After her marriage to Powell in 1947, she became a 
contributor and later associate editor of the Review. After 
supplying the committee with her personal history, Sylvia 
refused to answer questions about her role at The China 
Monthly Review or about her husband's whereabouts. She took 
her constitutional privilege under the Fifth Amendment and 
declined even to acknowledge the name of her husband.
Ex-POWs testified that, contrary to Powell's reports, 
they had been brutally treated in prison camps, and that the 
peace appeal signed by prisoners was the result of forced 
indoctrination under conditions of duress. Mrs. Gill, widow of 
Lt. Gill, again recounted her agony over her husband's 
imprisonment. One of the witnesses said he was with Lt. Gill 
and that Lt. Gill was starving and suffering from dysentery 
when Mrs. Gill got the letter from Powell.
11 Powell interview, March 19-23, 1993.
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After the hearings, the subcommittee came to the 
following conclusions: (1) Powell was in a position to know
the falsity of much of the material he published about the 
American government and American soldiers at war. (2) His 
magazine was used extensively by the Chinese Communists to 
brainwash American POWs under inhuman conditions. (3) The 
Review was both controlled and supported by the Chinese 
government. (4) Powell had defied a subpoena of the U.S. 
Senate. Sen. Welker accused Powell of hiding from justice, and 
the subcommittee reiterated its pledge to press for a treason 
prosecution against him.12
The San Francisco hearing cost the Powells dearly. An 
hour and a half after Sylvia testified and revealed that she 
had been working for the National Foundation for Infantile 
Paralysis, she was fired. The foundation explained that Mrs. 
Sylvia Powell was an embarrassment to the national 
philanthropic organization, to its many volunteers and to its 
staff workers.13
After the subcommittee returned to Washington, D.C., 
Powell appeared at a China policy forum in Palo Alto. Asked 
about the germ warfare reporting in the Review. Powell said he 
saw evidence of germ warfare collected in Korea. He said he 
saw evidence just outside the town he lived in and that 
plague, cholera, and smallpox suddenly erupted in areas where
12 Hearings. p. 70; pp. 2161-2276.
13 Powell interview, March 19-23, 1993.
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such diseases had been completely wiped out.14
On April 25, 1956, Powell, his wife and the Review's
associate editor Julian Schuman were indicted for sedition 
under Section 2 3 88 of Title 18 of the United States Code. 
Schuman had returned to the United States at the end of 1953. 
A federal grand jury in San Francisco returned a total of 
thirteen counts of sedition against them. The indictment 
charged that Powell had published in his magazine statements, 
knowing them to be false, and with the intent of interfering 
with U.S. forces and to aid their enemies. These included 
assertions that: (a) U.S. forces in Korea were engaged in
aggressive acts; (b) the United States used Korea as a testing
ground for gas weapons and germ warfare; (c) United States 
casualties were of a certain number (higher than official 
figures); and (d) U.S. negotiators deliberately stalled and 
sabotaged the Korean truce talks. The indictment was that the 
Review published statements intended to "cause
insubordination, disloyalty and mutiny" among U.S. soldiers 
and to obstruct recruiting and enlistment. These included 
criticism of the government of the United States and of Chiang 
Kai-shek, criticisms of U.S. foreign policy, defense of the 
government of China and North Korea, and the statement that 
the North Koreans were merely defending their homelands.15
Julian Schuman was the Review's associate editor in
14 Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee, pp. 68-69.
15 Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee, pp. 66-67.
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Shanghai from spring 1950 until its closing. He was born in 
Boston in 1920, and had studied Chinese at Harvard and Yale 
through the Army's language training program. He worked as an 
army cryptanalyst until the end of 1947 when he decided to go 
to China on his own. While in China, he first landed a job 
with the China Press. He did freelance writing for the 
American Broadcasting Company, the Chicago Sun-Times. and the 
Denver Post before taking his job at The China Monthly Review.
When Schuman returned to the United States from China at 
the end of 1953, he also found himself, like the Powells, to 
be unpopular with the government. He was called in March 1956 
to testify before the Senate Subcommittee on Internal 
Security. The subcommittee provided a long list of the places 
he visited in the United States and pro-China articles he 
wrote from China. At the hearing, he answered most of the 
questions about his education and employment record, but 
frequently refused to discuss his writings and his affiliation 
by invoking his constitutional rights.16
To prove their innocence, Powell and his co-defendants 
had several choices. They could demonstrate the absence of 
evil intent or that their reporting had presented no "clear or 
present danger" to national interest; or they could 
demonstrate the truth of the their statements. The defendants 
pleaded not guilty in September 1956, and chose the second
16 Hearings. Internal Security Subcommittee, 84th
Congress, 2nd Session (March 21, 1956,) pp. 515-549.
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option. As the U.S. government was sensitive to the germ 
warfare accusation and the subject was related to classified 
documents which the government controlled, the defendants 
maintained that they were forced too obtain evidence from the 
People's Republic of China. However, the United States did not 
diplomatically recognize China and North Korea, and the State 
Department would not issue passports valid for travel to the 
two countries. After repeated requests to the court, the 
defendants' lawyers were permitted to travel to China, where 
they could take depositions. But, the U.S. government objected 
to the taking of depositions in Peking on the ground that 
government counsel would not have official access to the 
Chinese mainland inasmuch as the United States did not 
recognize the People's Republic of China.
Federal Judge Louis Goodman finally ordered that the 
depositions be taken in the British colony of Hong Kong. In 
December 1956, Powell's lawyers moved for an extension of the 
time fixed for the taking of depositions in Hong Kong and they 
advised the court that the Chinese witnesses were unwilling to 
travel to Hong Kong. One of the defendants' lawyers, A. L. 
Wirin, would have to travel to China to persuade those 
witnesses to go to Hong Kong. Wirin stated that the Chinese 
government would grant him a visa without requiring him to 
present a valid U.S. passport. However, about a month later, 
the Chinese government reversed itself and, in March 1957, 
Judge Goodman stated that he had no jurisdiction to order the
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State Department to validate Wirin's passport for travel to 
China. Five months later, Wirin requested an order asking the 
Chinese government to provide judicial assistance as to the 
prospective witnesses' availability to give their depositions 
at some particular time and place. The Ministry of Justice of 
China replied that such request would not be honored, because 
there was no agreement between the two governments concerning 
judicial assistance. Finally, Wirin filed for a dismissal of 
the indictment, arguing that the government's refusal to 
validate his passport for travel to China and North Korea 
deprived the defendants' of an adequate opportunity to prepare 
for their defense.
Without questioning the U.S. foreign policy toward China 
and North Korea, Judge Goodman was concerned with whether the 
defendants were deprived of their constitutional rights of due 
process and of fair trial by the acts of the United States, 
which prevented their counsel from gathering evidence for 
their defense. He agreed that the evidence necessary for their 
defense was in China and North Korea; and without giving the 
defendants the opportunity to gather evidence, the rights 
granted by the Constitution would become meaningless. He was 
impressed with Wirin's list of more than one hundred 
prospective witnesses who could offer evidence to counter the 
charges that the defendants had falsely characterized the 
American war effort, truce negotiations, war casualties, and 
the use of germ warfare. "So the United States has its
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choice," Judge Goodman stated. "It can choose to adhere to its 
policy of non-issuance of such passports. Or it can decide 
that it is more important to prosecute this criminal case. If 
the former be its choice, it will mean a discontinuance of the 
present prosecution.1,17
Three weeks later, the State Department reluctantly 
agreed to issue Wirin a passport for China and North Korea, 
believing that it was more important to try the Powell case 
than to maintain passport purity with China. Wirin entered
China on January 7, 1958, and left at the end of February.
While in China, Wirin talked to about fifty witnesses who said 
they saw American planes dropped containers of insects over 
Chinese towns and villagers and could testify that the insects 
carried germs. But the witnesses would not appear at a trial 
unless the United States and China had a judicial agreement. 
Just before the scheduled opening of the trial on July 14, 
1958, Wirin moved for dismissal of the indictment on the 
grounds that the witnesses could not appear because of the 
hostility between the two nations. The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals refused to issue a writ of mandamus directing a
dismissal.
As part of the defense, Powell's lawyers subpoenaed 
various federal departments and congressional committees,
directing for the release of documents related to American 
aggression, germ warfare, and the conduct of the truce
17 United States v. Powell. 156 F. Supp. 526-535 (1957).
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negotiations. Officials soon became worried that classified 
records would have to be brought to the court and the trial 
could have propaganda value for unfriendly nations. Assistant 
U.S. Attorney James B. Schnake told the court that the 
government would not offer any evidence on these issues and 
said that the defense demand would threaten military security. 
Defense lawyer Doris Walker responded that she would not allow 
the government to define the boundary of proof for the 
defense.
Finally, after several postponements, Judge Goodman 
ordered the trial set for January 26, 1959. During the trial, 
the government offered the testimony of Private Page Baylor, 
a former POW in Korea, to show the distribution of The China 
Monthly Review, among the POWs and to show the effect the 
Review's articles had upon them. The court agreed with the 
defense objection that the testimony was inadmissible because 
a provision of the sedition laws limits its application to the 
United States and its admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and 
ordered the argument on the objection to be held in the 
absence of the jury.18
During the objection argument, Schnake stated that in his 
opinion, the evidence in question had established actual
18 Section 2 388 of Title 18 of the United States Code says 
that activities affecting armed forces during war shall be 
punished and it shall apply within the admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction of the United States, and on the high seas, as 
well within the United States. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62
Sta.811.)
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treason on the part of the defendants. Judge Goodman also 
stated that the evidence presented so far would be "prima 
facie sufficient" (enough at first glance) to prove treason 
since treason law did not have the same jurisdiction 
limitations as sedition law. Reporters, after checking the 
official court transcript to insure accuracy, quoted the 
judge's comments. Some newspaper headlines stated that the 
judge declared "the Powells guilty of treason," and that "the 
judge had flayed the Powells." The next day, the defense 
lawyer, Doris Walker, tendered a motion for mistrial on the 
ground that the newspapers in the San Francisco area had 
published inflammatory articles and headlines indicating that 
the trial judge had declared the defendants guilty of treason.
Judge Goodman agreed to the motion for a mistrial on the 
ground of prejudicial publicity. He explained he had made the 
remarks about treason in response to prosecution arguments and 
during the absence of the jury, and criticized the media for 
thwarting the just administration of justice.19
However, the government immediately filed a new complaint 
of treason against the defendants and asked that they be held 
without bail. Defense counsels called the new charge a 
"miserable, filthy trick" and "dirty pool."20 Defense attorney 
Charles Garry argued that there had been no prima facie
19 United States v. Powell. 171 F. Supp. 203-205.
20 San Francisco Chronicle. Jan. 31, 1959.
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showing of treason and that the government had not offered two 
witnesses to any overt act of treason. The court agreed again. 
The Justice Department never was able to offer witnesses for 
the treason charges; and in the end, when it sought to 
continue the treason charge again in July 1959, the U.S. 
Commissioner in San Francisco denied and dismissed the 
complaint.
Finally, in 1961, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy 
ordered the sedition indictment dismissed and closed the 
investigation, saying that because of the existing conditions 
in mainland China, direct testimony of two witnesses to an 
overt act of treason could not be obtained.21
21 Report of the Attorney General, (1962), p. 257.
Chapter Six. The Conclusion
The sedition law had been in existence long before 
Powell's indictment. The first sedition law of the United 
States, the Alien and Sedition Acts, was passed by Congress in 
1797 for the purpose of punishing opposition to the 
government. It was in fact aimed at editors who published or 
uttered false, scandalous and malicious criticism of the 
President, Congress, or others in government with the intent 
to defame them or bring them into disrepute. However, the law 
was short-lived and died in 1801 after Thomas Jefferson became 
president of the United States.
Later on, wartime emergencies in the Civil War and World 
War I brought new sedition statutes. The Espionage Act of 1917 
and its amendments in 1918 made it unlawful for anybody to 
speak or publish anything with the intention of causing 
contempt, scorn, or disrepute of the form of government, the 
Constitution, the flag or the military cause of the United 
States. In the famous case of Schenck v. U.S., Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes enunciated the "clear and present danger test." 
He wrote: "When a nation is at war many things that might be 
said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that 
their utterance will not be endured."1 The test was 
subsequently invoked in various cases, and was used to warrant 
government's prosecution of dissent. The sedition law was 
enlarged and updated several times, and was finally labeled
1 Schenck v. United States. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
64
65
Section 2388 of Title 18 of the United States Code in 1948.2
Although the sedition charges against Powell and his co­
defendants were dropped, the Powells and Schuman paid a high 
price. To meet their $40,000 legal bills, they had to borrow 
money from relatives and friends, and raised funds on their 
own. During the trial, the Powells had to send their children 
off to stay with friends and relatives. Sylvia lost her job. 
Powell, who was selling school supplies, had just received a 
big order from a community across the bay when the story of 
the trial hit the area newspapers. The order and the job were 
canceled. Even Powell's auto insurance company attempted to 
drop his coverage because of the fear that somebody might 
damage his car.
Still, many people supported the Powells. The American 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) stepped in to oppose the 
prosecution, claiming it constituted a serious threat to the 
press freedom guaranteed under the First Amendment. At the 
children's center where their two boys were being cared for, 
the teachers took every precaution to protect the children 
from any adverse publicity. Powell also recalled that when he 
took his Volkswagen to be serviced, the garage owner said he 
had read about their case in the paper and suggested that 
Powell bring the car in regularly, regardless of whether he 
had the money to pay for the service.
2 Harold L. Nelson and Dwight L. Teeter, Jr. , Law of Mass 
Communication (New York: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1982), 
pp. 35-45.
66
While the trial was still going on, an artist friend 
suggested that they fix and enlarge their tiny house. Powell, 
who had read some books on carpentry, added another room to 
the house and sold the expanded house. Soon the Powells 
started their own business, buying old houses, fixing them and 
then selling them. From this, they branched into the buying 
and selling of antiques. They ran an antique shop on Church 
Street in San Francisco until their retirement a few years 
ago. Their oldest son, John, took over the business.
Julian Schuman went back to China in 1964 to work as a 
English language expert for a foreign language press in 
Beijing and in 1981 helped China launch its first English 
language newspaper, China Daily. He continues to work for that 
paper today.3
The Powells do not regret what they wrote in the Review 
forty years ago. They remain as convinced as they were in the 
1950s that the United States had been engaged in germ warfare 
against the North Koreans and the Chinese. Although he had not 
personally talked to any victims of the alleged germ warfare, 
Powell had regularly interviewed Chinese and foreign friends 
who had been to areas affected by air-dropped germs. "This is 
not a rehearsed story," Powell said. "If they (the Chinese) 
want to fake something, you will assume that the government 
would have a great deal of control over the villagers. But
3 Powell interview, March 19-23, 1993; Sun Francisco
Sunday Examiner & Chronicle. March 13, 1977.
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villagers did not tell the same thing, and they argued among 
themselves.1,4 According to the Powells, the list of scientists 
and journalists who investigated the evidence is impressive, 
and so was the exhibit that China held at the Asian Pacific 
Peace Conference held in Beijing in October 1952.
Although Powell had heard about the Red hysteria in the 
United States when he was in China, he never realized that it 
was going to affect him and his family the way it did when 
they returned to the United States. He did not know whether 
his journal had ever been used to indoctrinate Americans in 
prison camps, since, he said, he did not handle circulation 
himself and the Review was available on any newsstand at that 
time.
He emphasized that he is a "cause journalist" and that 
his magazine was an opinion journal. He wanted to use the 
magazine to fairly explain China to the West. He tried to 
balance everything he wrote, but it was hard. "I was very 
sympathetic with China because I thought China always got the 
short end of the deal with the West from the days of the Opium
War on," he said. "If you read the American papers during the
same period, you could not find anything good about China in 
them. They were not the textbook journalism.1,5
When the Justice Department pressed sedition charges 
against the Powells, it maintained that Powell's writings were
4 Powell interview, March 19-23, 1993.
5 Powell interview, March 19-23, 1993.
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presented as facts instead of mere opinions. Powell disagreed 
and said his writings only represented his opinions. This 
argument between Powell and the government was never resolved. 
In retrospect, Powell said that if he had anticipated his 
subsequent ordeal, he would have written the same thing, but 
in a legally more cautious way. For example, in reporting the 
germ warfare charges, he would make it clearer that the 
charges had been reported in China, and that he was offering 
his opinions on their validity, based on the examination of 
the evidence.
The lapse of time has not dried up Powell's interest in 
germ warfare. In 1977, he retired to his study above his 
antique shop to resume his writing about Asia and germ 
warfare. Today, to further prove the truthfulness of what he 
had written during the Korean War, he has been trying to 
obtain previously classified documents from the government 
through the Freedom of Information Act.6
The sedition indictment charged Powell with wrongfully 
accusing the United States of employing Japanese biological 
warfare experts in the Korean War. However, recent evidence 
tends to support Powell's contention. After years of research 
and efforts to obtain classified government documents, Powell 
found that during World War II, the Japanese had flown over 
Chinese cities, dropping plague-laden insects and grains in 
order to trigger an epidemic. What is more important is that
6 Powell interview, March 19-23, 1993.
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the Japanese honed their germ warfare weapons on captive human 
subjects including many American prisoners of war. However, 
the American government had deliberately concealed these
crimes to use the fruits of the research for its
own biological weapons program. Powell's findings were
confirmed by various other sources.7
Japan's BW experiments were directed by Lieutenant
General Ishii Shiro. At the end of World War II, the American 
military agreed that Shiro and others in his Unit 731 would 
not be tried as war criminals. In return, Shiro turned over 
the records of his experiments. Powell found a memorandum 
dated Dec. 12, 1947, addressed to the head of the U.S. Army 
Chemical Corps, which supplied a partial inventory of some of 
the human experiments conducted by the Japanese.8
Powell's finding made international headlines when it was 
published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the 
Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars in 1980 and 1981. A 
Dutch jurist, Bert V.A. Rolling, who served on the Tokyo war
crimes tribunal after World War II, said of Powell's
7 Discussions of Japan's experiment with germ warfare and 
the U.S. subsequent use of Japanese BW personnel can be found 
in at least two sources: Peter William and David Wallace, Unit 
731: Japan's Secret Biological Warfare in World War II. (New 
York: The Free Press, 1988); and Mark Ryan, Chinese Attitudes 
Toward Nuclear Weapons. China and the United States During the 
Korean War. (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1989.)
8 John W. Powell, "A Hidden Chapter in History,"
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. October 1981, pp. 37-44; 
and "Japan's Germ Warfare: The U.S. Cover-up of a War Crime," 
Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars. October-December 1980,
pp. 12-16.
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discovery: "It is a bitter experience for me to be informed 
now that centrally-ordered Japanese criminality of the most 
disgusting kind was kept secret from the court by the U.S. 
government."9 This supports Powell's early reports about the 
U.S. germ warfare program, but it is by no means evidence of 
the alleged U.S. use of germ warfare techniques in the Korean 
War.
Powell saw The China Monthly Review as his opinion 
magazine. His statements in the Review that the United States 
was an aggressor in Korea and that U.S. negotiators stalled 
the negotiations were clearly opinions. What about other 
charges that America used gas and germ warfare in Korea, and 
that casualties were of a certain number? At the first glance, 
it would seem that these items have been presented as matters 
of fact. But on closer examination they too can be seen as an 
editor's opinions. After reading Powell's articles, no one 
would seriously believe that the writer had actually been to 
the battle field and had personally counted the dead and the 
injured. In the germ warfare case, no reader would necessarily 
assume that Powell had himself been present in a gas or germ 
warfare attack.
In fact, Powell's statements on germ warfare took this 
form: (a) charges of germ warfare have been made against the
United States; (b) he has examined published evidence which is 
said to prove the truth of these charges; (c) in his opinion,
9 San Francisco Chronicle. Dec. 14, 1981.
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the evidence is sufficient to prove the charges true. Powell 
was charged with attempting to influence public opinions and 
to cause disloyalty; but only a few hundred copies of the 
journal were circulated in the United States.10
Powell's defense of the Communists in China and his 
laudatory reports about the new-born republic were a product 
of history. He ran the Review during a unigue period of China 
—  during the last three years of the Nationalists and the 
first three years of the Communist rule. The corruption and 
hopelessness of the Nationalists during their final days 
contrasted with the great progress and improvements that the 
Communists made after they took over the mainland. The first 
three years of Communist rule were a period of euphoria. It 
was difficult to balance the reporting, Powell acknowledged. 
The Communists made a lot of mistakes, Powell said, but they 
were nothing in comparison with those of the Nationalists. 
Powell was not alone in holding this view at that time; most 
Westerners who had been in China during the same period wrote 
the same impressions about China. It must be noted, however, 
that Powell did not stay in China long enough to see the 
development of more serious problems, which culminated in the 
Cultural Revolution and Tiananmen Sguare.
The U.S. government had its reasons for prosecuting 
Powell and his co-defendants. The BW issue was, of course, a 
sensitive issue, made more so by the fact that the United
10 The Nation. Feb. 16, 1957. pp. 136-137.
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States had never signed the Geneva Protocol of 1925 outlawing 
chemical and BW warfare. The subject became particularly 
delicate because the United States had just dropped the atomic 
bomb on another Asian country, and some people viewed that as 
an racist action.
As the sedition case dragged on, the government was 
caught in a dilemma. To prove the falsity of Powell's claims, 
the government would have to reveal classified documents. Yet 
to further tolerate Powell would be tantamount to admitting 
that he was correct in his charges. Therefore, a mistrial 
based on some technical mistakes may have seemed an 
appropriate solution for the government. The defendants' 
careers and lives were devastated because of the publicity of 
their case, yet the government's denial of the germ warfare 
charges remained intact.
The U.S. government obviously had something to hide when 
it sought to punish the defendants. Powell recalled that the 
Justice Department tried to work out a deal with him— that is, 
if Powell would plead guilty to any of the counts he had been 
charged with, Sylvia and Schuman would be pardoned, and the 
government would make the punishment for Powell very light.11
Powell's germ warfare charges remain unproved. Western 
historiography of the Korean War has largely treated Chinese 
charges of germ warfare as an isolated and transparent 
propaganda ploy, whereas Chinese history books still treat it
11 Powell interview, March 19-23, 1993.
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as a matter of fact that the United States committed germ 
warfare during the Korean War.12
Powell was simply the victim of the Red fear to the 
extreme. When U.S. foreign service officers and other China 
beat journalists returned to the United States after the 
Chinese civil war, they were accused of losing China to the 
Communists. Powell would have run into the same trouble had he 
come home with them. Instead he stayed for three or four more 
years. His charges against the U.S. government were more 
serious and that inevitably brought him more trouble with the 
government.
An advocate of China, Powell took the side of the Chinese 
Communists and was not very objective or thorough in his 
reporting. Yet, an examination of his writing does not suggest 
that he knowingly falsified anything. He did the best he could 
to check out facts in the kind of environment he had in 
Shanghai. He certainly lost his balance in using Chinese 
sources almost exclusively. Still, his behavior did not 
warrant the suffering that he and his family went through.
Powell's ordeal shows present journalists how difficult 
it can be to cover a foreign, especially an unfriendly, 
country during time of war. When tension is high between
12 Detailed discussions of the alleged germ warfare by 
Chinese scholars can be found in: Shen Zonghong and Meng
Zhaohui, History of the War to Resist Americans and Aid Korea 
(Beijing: The Military Science Press, 1988); and Deng Liqun, 
Ma Hong, and Wu Heng, China Today: War to Resist U.S.
Aggression and Aid Korea (Beijing: Press of Chinese Academy of 
Social Science, 1990).
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nations, official newsmakers tend to manipulate the news media 
to their own advantage. Journalists should always be skeptical 
of official news sources. Otherwise the best-trained reporter 
could easily lose his balance. On the other hand, foreign 
corespondents are often accused of being unpatriotic if they 
report things that people back home do not want to hear. What 
happened to Powell and old China Hand journalists should give 
pause to present-day journalists.
Today, when it comes to reporting on U.S. policies toward 
China, U.S. news media tend to protect U.S. policies and 
interests from public scrutiny. In comparison with the 1930s 
and 1940s, there is a lack of diverse opinions in China policy 
reporting today. The media have come to identify more and more 
with policy-makers and have unwillingly become their surrogate 
voice. The result of this is that today's reporting about 
China tends to show a uniform pattern. If there is to be a 
clear public understanding of China and U.S.-China relations, 
journalists must be free to report diverse and sometimes 
unpopular opinions.13
13 Chang, Tsan-Kuo. "Reporting U.S. China Policy, 1950- 
1985: Presumptions of Legitimacy and Hierarchy." The article 
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A Chronology of John William Powell 
born in Shanghai.
went to the United States and stayed until 
1926.
went to China for a year, and attended the 
American School in Shanghai for about a 
year.
returned to United States and went to 
school in Hannibal and Columbia, Missouri 
until May 1938.
went to University of Missouri to study 
journalism and history.
worked for China Press in Shanghai as a 
reporter and staff writer.
returned to University of Missouri to 
study journalism.
worked for Federal Communication 
Commission in Washington, D.C. till 
December 1942.
worked for the Office of War Information 
in New York, Chunking, Kweilin, and 
Kunming.
The China Weekly Review was restarted by 
Powell.
married Sylvia Campbell.
returned to United States after closing 
the Review.
Senate Internaltestified before U.S. 
Security Subcommittee.
indicted for sedition.
mistrial of sedition case after 5 days of 
court hearings.
1961 sedition charge against Powell and his co­
defendants dismissed by U.S. Attorney- 






opened antique shop. Also rehabilitated 
houses and apartment houses for resale.
November first return trip to China since 1953.
retired from antique shop to do research 
and writing.
published first article, in academic 
journal, on Japanese germ warfare against 
China. This and subsequent articles, based 
on formerly secret materials found in U.S. 
Government archives, detailed Japanese 
atrocities and revealed U.S. government's 
cover-up and protection of Japanese war 
criminals. These articles were widely 
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